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STRUCTURING BETTER CAPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
COURTNEY MORAN AND CASEY BALL*

ABSTRACT
Policymakers who are eager to promote the development and adoption of
environmentally sustainable technologies too often ignore certain important regulatory principles when crafting incentive programs. Some approaches to limiting and winding down sustainability incentive programs
have proven to be inefficient and unjust. Too often, the winding down process only begins when lawmakers face unpredicted budgetary constraints.
This article argues that state and federal lawmakers could better promote
economic efficiency and equity in sustainability-oriented policy design by
more consistently adhering to the principles of gradualism, adequate notice, and respect for investment-backed expectations. Using examples of
deficiencies in certain net metering program caps, tax credit program sunsets, and High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane access rules for electric cars,
this article illustrates the importance of these core regulatory principles
and advocates for a greater focus on them in the structuring of limits on
sustainability incentive policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Todd and Sylvia Alfortish purchased a rooftop solar energy system in
Louisiana, expecting to receive tax credits from the state to reduce the system’s
overall price.1 To cover the up-front costs of installation until they received their tax
credit, Todd and Sylvia obtained an eighteen-month “interest free” bridge loan.2 As
part of the sales pitch to Todd and Sylvia, the company that sold the solar panels to
the couple allegedly guaranteed they would receive the state income tax credits. 3
Unfortunately, the legislature abruptly placed a cap on the tax credits that limited
the credit’s availability far below the expected demand.4
When Todd and Sylvia ultimately applied for the tax credit, their application
was denied because the state’s new cap on the program had already been met.5
Then the couple learned that their “interest free” bridge loan was actually an “interest waivable” loan, and that the interest was waivable only if they received the
income tax credit.6 Soon, Todd and Sylvia faced large payments on their bridge loan,
with no hope of receiving help from the tax credit program.7
1.

Class Action Complaint at 2, Alfortish v. GreenSky, LLC, No. CV 16-15084 (E.D. La. Sept. 30,

2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Lawmakers Curtail Louisiana’s Generous Solar Tax Break, KATC.COM (June 23, 2015),
http://www.katc.com/story/29391294/lawmakers-curtail-louisianas-generous-solar-tax-break [hereinafter Lawmakers].
5. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id.
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Louisiana’s swift suspension of its solar energy tax credit program caught hundreds of Louisiana households off guard. Many of these families are now part of a
class action lawsuit against solar installation and financing companies, claiming,
among other things, that the companies misled them about the large tax credits
when selling them solar panels.8 However, the Louisiana state legislature is arguably at least partially to blame for so quickly ending the state’s solar energy tax
credit.9
Policymakers who are eager to promote the development and adoption of environmentally sustainable technologies too often ignore some important regulatory
principles. Programs without effective caps or sunset provisions can quickly turn
from being a boon to the renewables industry into a hindrance. A poorly-crafted
incentive program quickly runs up against budgetary and political concerns, and
tends to evoke drastic measures to curtail the program. 10 This article focuses on the
need for careful planning at the front-end of incentive programs and advocates for
adherence to basic regulatory principles that policymakers often overlook in their
zeal to provide subsidies for renewable energy projects.
Part I of this article highlights three essential and often-overlooked principles
associated with the formation of effective government-funded incentive programs:
gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and providing adequate
notice of program changes. Part II focuses on two specific examples of incentive
programs for sustainability-oriented investment—net metering and tax credits—
and explains how inadequate adherence to the principles listed above unjustifiably
constrained their effectiveness. Part II also examines some recent smaller incentive
programs facing similar challenges. Finally, Part II proposes some specific ways that
policymakers can avoid repeating these mistakes when designing future sustainability policy incentives.
A. Environmental Subsidies and Important Regulatory Principles
Over the past decade, subsidies and incentive programs helped unleash unprecedented growth in renewable energy and other sustainability-oriented development.11 Subsidies increase demand for a product, which leads to more research

8. See Michael Abella, Kenner Couple Alleges GreenSky, SunTrust Misrepresented Loans,
LOUISIANA RECORD (Nov. 8, 2016), http://louisianarecord.com/stories/511018723-kenner-couple-allegesgreensky-suntrust-misrepresented-loans.
9. Not surprisingly, solar system owners have also formed a class action, suing the Louisiana
Department of Revenue, claiming they are entitled to tax credits that were supposed to be guaranteed. See
Solar Panel Customers Sue State Over Tax Credits, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 14, 2016),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/09/solar_panel_customers_sue_stat.html.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Matt Weiser, Here Comes the Sun: US Solar Power Market Hits All-Time High, THE GUARDIAN
(June 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/jun/28/solar-power-energy-usutilities-environment-climate-change.
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and development, ultimately lowering the cost to produce the product. 12 If subsidies are implemented correctly, market forces should allow a new technology to
slowly wean off the subsidy and become competitive against established technology.
In the mid-2000s, U.S. lawmakers enacted several bipartisan programs to incentivize a gradual transition to renewable energies. 13 Congress enacted the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 because
of high oil prices and serious concerns that the U.S. was too dependent on foreign
supplies.14 Global climate change concerns also spurred efforts to move the U.S.
from its dependence on cheap fossil fuels to more environmentally friendly sources
of energy. These efforts included federal tax credits for wind and solar, the Environmental Protection Agency’s crackdown on coal-fired power plants,15 and the U.S.
commitment to the Paris Agreement.16
Unfortunately, some poorly-designed sustainability incentive policies recently
generated political backlash, angered citizens, spurred unnecessary litigation, and
created severe budgetary problems for the governments enacting them. 17 In many
cases, governments brought these problems upon themselves by ignoring three
basic principles: gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and
providing adequate notice before materially changing incentive policies.
Why, then, have many policymakers overlooked them in recent years in their
crafting of sustainability-oriented incentive programs? Also, how can governments
better avoid making similar mistakes in the future? This section describes the role
that incentive programs played in promoting environmentally sustainable development over the past decade, explains the importance of the three aforementioned
principles in the crafting of these policies, and highlights some specific examples of
instances when governments have ignored these principles to their peril.
i. Basic Overview of Subsidies and Incentive Programs for Environmental
Sustainability
Many recent renewable energy subsidies were created, at least in part, to curb
the effects of climate change. Climate change is a growing and daunting concern
that calls for not only a local response, but also a global response.18 The leading
12. Camilo Patrignani, The Solar Industry Needs to Let Its Federal Tax Credit Die, Says This CEO,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-solar-industryneeds-to-let-its-federal-tax-credit-die-says-this-ceo#gs.Gmb3lg8.
13. Guri Bang, Energy Security and Climate Change Concerns: Triggers for Energy Policy Change
in the United States?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1649 (2010).
14. Id. at 1651–52.
15. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,667 (Dec. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
16. William Yardley & Vera Haller, At U.N., 175 Nations Sign Landmark Accord on Global Warming. ‘We Are in a Race Against Time, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-sejclimate-change-20160422-story.html.
17. See infra Part II.
18. “Climate change refers to any significant change in the measures of climate lasting for an
extended period of time . . . climate change includes major changes in temperature, precipitation, or wind
patterns, among others, that occur over several decades or longer.” Glossary of Climate Change Terms, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2016).
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cause of climate change is greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane,
produced by the consumption of fossil fuels. 19 If climate change remains unchecked, it can reduce crop production, affect human health, and contribute to a
rise in sea levels.20
Renewable energy sources emit fewer greenhouse gases than fossil fuels.21
Over the last decade, renewable energy production in the United States grew steadily, with significant increases in the solar and wind industries.22 Hybrid and electric
vehicles continue to grow in popularity—enough that states are developing new
taxes to replace the antiquated gasoline tax.23 What is driving this investment in
clean, renewable energy sources? In a word, subsidies.
Subsidies are broadly defined as government-provided benefits to businesses
or individuals who satisfy certain specified requirements. 24 Development subsidies
are generally justified as means of helping recipients capture more societal benefits
from their development activities.25 These captured social benefits are also commonly referred to as positive externalities. Subsidies take many forms, including tax
credits, grants, in-kind subsidies, and cross-subsidies.26 Subsidies in the renewable
energy industry encourage consumers and businesses to invest in sustainable energy projects that might otherwise be more expensive than non-renewable sources
of energy.27 For example, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, citizens and businesses that invested in nonresidential or residential solar energy installations were
eligible for federal tax credits ranging from to 10–30% of the project cost.28

19. Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource
Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 66 (2011); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (Cambridge University Press 2014),
http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
20. Klass, supra note 19.
21. Jaron L. Hudgins, Alternative Energy in the U.S. Energy Supply: Current Trends and Recommendations for the Future, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 383, 384–85 (2013).
22. Adam Wilson, The Future Looks Bright, or Does It? An Analysis of Solar Energy Law and Policy
in the United States, 22 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 333, 335 (2016) (“Solar electricity production has seen
stunning growth rates in the past five years: 2011 saw a 67%increase in generation over 2010, 2012 saw a
42% increase, 2013 saw a 47% increase, and 2014 saw a 104% increase.”). See also Dep’t of Energy, 20%
Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy’s Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply, ENERGY.GOV,
https://energy.gov/eere/wind/20-wind-energy-2030-increasing-wind-energys-contribution-us-electricitysupply (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) (Additionally, wind energy is expected to supply 20% of the United States’
electricity in 2030 and 35% in 2050.).
23. See, e.g., Courtney Moran & Casey Ball, Penny Lane, Literally: Funding Roads One Vehicle
Mile at a Time, 5 WILLAMETTE ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2016).
24. RONALD STEENBLIK, A SUBSIDY PRIMER 8 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., n.d.)
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/primer.pdf.
25. Return-on-Investment for Select State Economic Development Incentive Programs, Off. of
Econ. & Demographic Res. 6 (Jan. 1, 2014), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/returnoninvestment/EDR_ROI.pdf.
26. STEENBLIK, supra note 24, at 18.
27. Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A Comparative
Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 419–20 (2005).
28. Kyle Weismantle, Building a Better Solar Energy Framework, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 221, 232
(2014) (The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 has extended this federal tax credit through to
2016.).
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Incentive programs should not be permanent fixtures in the energy industry.
By their very nature, subsidies should taper as new technologies develop a foothold
in the market.29 Thus, when lawmakers develop a subsidy, they must consider the
endgame. A subsidy without a cap or sunset provision may prove disastrous for a
government’s budget, as evidenced by Louisiana’s Solar Energy Tax Credit. 30 The
next sections discuss three regulatory principles that, if applied at the formation of
a subsidy, will lead to greater success.
ii. The Principle of Gradualism
A well-designed incentive program requires the predictability that comes from
gradual changes to the benefits it provides. While the term “gradualism” encompasses many definitions across a variety of fields, 31 for purposes of this article,
“gradualism” represents the principle that, when possible, policy changes “should
be implemented without creating dramatic shifts in cost and benefits to individuals
or groups.”32 All else equal, lawmakers should seek to implement new policies and
end existing policies in ways that provide sufficient time for citizens and businesses
to efficiently adapt.33 Because the renewable energy industry is subject to complex
market dynamics, 34 lawmakers must first understand how policy influences the
market, and then monitor the market to allow for a gradual response to policy
changes.35
The virtues of gradualism have been understood for centuries. Even Aesop’s
ancient fable of The Tortoise and the Hare highlights the value of gradualism in ways
that would benefit modern incentive programs. In the fable, a tortoise and a hare
agree to a race. The hare, excited and confident that he can win, starts the race at
a sprint, while the tortoise moves at a slower, but consistent pace. Ultimately, the
hare becomes over-confident and stops running before reaching the finish line. In
29. R. Haas et al., How to Promote Renewable Energy Systems Successfully and Effectively, 32
ENERGY POL’Y 833, 838 (2004) (“In later market stages, [subsidies] should be reduced. At the same time excessive (windfall) profits should be avoided.”).
30. See infra Part II.B.i.
31. Other names for gradualism include incrementalism, rate shock, and rate stability.
32. Memorandum from Roger Gray et al. to Comm’rs Simpson, Brown, Helgeson, Manning &
Mital 6 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20140717042712/http://www.eweb.org/public/commissioners/meetings/2013/130305/M8_BackgrounderWhitepaperonEWEBRateMakingPrinciples.pdf.
33. See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS
MODELS 79 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER], https://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/NY_REV_Track_2_paper.pdf; William Opalka & Rich Heidorn, Jr., NYPSC Outlines Reforming the Energy Vision Changes, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.rtoinsider.com/nypsc-reforming-the-energy-vision-16910/.
34. See generally Scott Victor Valentine, Wind Power Policy in Complex Adaptive Markets, 19
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1 (2013).
35. Scott Victor Valentine, Gradualist Best Practice in Wind Power Policy, 22 ENERGY FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 75 (2014). But see Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Ali Al-Jabir, Application of the Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid for Approval of a Change in Electric and Gas Distribution
Rates Pursuant to R.I.G.L. Sections 39-3-10 and 39-1-3-11, No. 4323, at 5 (Aug. 30, 2012)
http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/4323-Navy-AlJabir(8-30-12).pdf (“Although factors such as . . .
, gradualism, . . . can also be taken into consideration when determining the final spread of the revenue
requirement among classes, the fundamental starting point and guideline should be the cost of serving each
customer class . . . “).
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contrast, the tortoise slowly trudges along and eventually overtakes the hare to win
the race. The familiar moral of this fable is that “slow and steady wins the race.” In
the context of designing policy incentives, Sir Rodger L’Estrange’s moral, published
in 1692, is an even better fit: “A [p]lodding [d]iligence brings us sooner to our [j]ourney’s [e]nd then a [f]luttering [w]ay of [a]dvancing by [s]tarts and by [s]tops; for ‘tis
[p]erseverance alone that can carry us [all the way].”36
Lawmakers often approach efforts to incentivize renewable energy technology like Aesop’s infamous hare. In many cases, the subsidies and incentive programs they design are generous in the first few years but then abruptly end and
destroy much of the momentum they generate. This “fluttering way of advancing”
unnecessarily dampens the effectiveness of policies aimed at promoting environmental sustainability and renewable energy technologies. 37 “Boom and bust” government policies, as some critics have labeled them, create regulatory uncertainty
and reduce investor confidence.38 Intermittent and haphazard energy policies also
have a chilling effect on the market for new and improved products. 39
The principle of gradualism is often cited in rate cases before public utility
commissions (PUCs).40 In the context of rate design, gradualism refers to “phasing
in rates . . . over a longer period of time allowing consumers to gradually make the
adjustments in the ‘elastic’ part of their spending so as to pay for increased . . .
costs. . . .”41 While on occasion PUCs have modified or rejected rate changes based
on concerns over abrupt changes affecting consumers,42 some states do not even

36. Sir Rodger L’Estrange, Fables, of Æsop and other Eminent Mythologists: with Morals and Reflexions, A Hare and a Tortoise 123–24 (London, R. Sare et al. 1692).
37. Id.
38. N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 89 n.90 (quoting Richard Schmalensee & Robert N.
Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 103, 117 (2013)).
39. JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BEYOND BOOM AND BUST: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY
INDEPENDENCE
37
(Brookings
Inst.,
2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0418_clean_investments_final-paper_PDF.pdf.
40. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis Dep’t of Pub. Utilities, 39066, 1991 WL 531202, at *72 ( Nov. 1,
1991)(“[U]tility rates should be designed to the maximum extent practicable to reflect the cost of providing
service, while avoiding abrupt changes in rate structures and undue hardship.”); Commissions Investigation
of Value & Cost of Distributed Generation, 334 P.U.R.4th 29, at 125 (Jan 3, 2017) (Adopting two new solar
valuation methodologies to replace net metering that will “provide a path for a gradual transition away
from the current net metering model to one that better reflects the value of [distributed generation].”);
Nev. Power Co., 15-07041 & 15-07042, 2016 WL 693150, at *68 ¶ 273 (Feb. 12, 2016) (“Gradualism is the
concept used by utility regulatory commissions to manage change associated with moving utility prices to
reflect new or changing rate structures of costs of service.”).
41. Lloyd v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 A.2d 1010, 1018 n.14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
42. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Power, 279 P.U.R.4th 1 (Feb. 18, 2010) (approving rate increase,
but staggering its implementation to conform with gradualism); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 213 P.U.R.4th 376,
at 5 (Nov. 20, 2001) (“When allocating a utility’s revenue requirement among customer classes, the Commission has pursued—where possible—a policy of gradualism by avoiding substantial rate increases for any
particular customer class.”).
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require their PUCs to consider gradualism.43 In addition to rate change cases, references to gradualism also appear in international trade agreements, 44 the Federal
Reserve interest rate policies,45 and case law.46
Of course, the principle of gradualism does not exist in a vacuum. Lawmakers
often face multiple goals when setting caps for tax credits or other incentive programs. Protecting consumers from dramatic shifts in costs is only one of those
goals.47 A few utility rate cases have even emphasized the potential danger of focusing only on gradualism at the expense of other important considerations. 48
Moreover, governing statutes for PUCs rarely require the commissions to specifically consider gradualism when setting rates and crafting policies.49
Nonetheless, policymakers in environmental sustainability have too often ignored gradualism to their peril. Two contrasting examples help to illustrate this
point. A first example is an electric utility rate case in Iowa in 2015. 50 The Iowa Utilities Board encouraged electric utilities to develop pilot programs to “expand renewable [distributed generation] in Iowa.”51 Two utilities, MidAmerican Energy and
43.

See, e.g., Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n. of Ohio, 926 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio

2010).
44. Richard Chisik, Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification, 59 J. INT’L
ECON. 367, 367 (2003); see also Richard M. Bird, A View From the North, 49 TAX L. REV. 745, 756 (1994)
(“When dealing with complex, uncertain and changing problems, both practice and theory suggest an incremental ‘problem-solving’ approach – ‘muddling through’ as it sometimes has been disrespectfully called
– is not only all that can be done, it is generally the best fallible humans can do.”); see Barbara A. Cherry,
Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the Rule of
Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 30 n. 191 (2008).
45. Jeremy C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, Gradualism in Monetary Policy: A Time-Consistency Problem?, 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21569, 2015); Ben S. Bernanke, Member, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at an Economics Luncheon Co-Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco & the Univ. of Wash. (May 20, 2004) (“As a general rule, the Federal Reserve
tends to adjust interest rates incrementally, in a series of small or moderate steps in the same direction.”).
46. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and
the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1122 (1988) (“The traditional judicial discourse, with its penchant for precedent, reasoning by analogy, and reliance upon the past, is essentially a
conservative one. . . . The most successful arguments, therefore, . . . advocate the kind of gradualism that
common law judges understand best. Such arguments result in incremental, rather than radical, change and
adapt easily to the preexisting regulatory scheme.”).
47. Perhaps the most prominent factor facing lawmakers is the budget. When Louisiana lowered
its cap on solar tax credits, the motivating factor was a budget deficit and inflated subsidy payments. Other
factors include guaranteeing a rate of return to utilities, competing economic interests, and of course, political agendas. See infra Part II.B.i.
48. Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, 926 N.E.2d at 266 (finding “no authority that gradualism is a factor
that the [public utilities] commission is required to apply in every rate-design case.”); Watergate E., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of D.C., 665 A.2d 943, 950 (D.C. 1995) (“We also observe . . . that in addition to its policy
of gradualism, the Commission was also required to consider the very large revenue deficit . . .”); Lloyd v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 A.2d 1010, 1020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“[W]hile permitted, gradualism is but one of many factors to be considered and weighed by the Commission in determining rate designs, and principles of gradualism cannot be allowed to trump all other valid ratemaking concerns . . . .”).
49. New Hampshire, for example, only requires that the commission consider whether the rates
are “unreasonable.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378:7 (West 2017). Nevada comes the closest by requiring the
commission to “[p]rovide for stability in rates and for the availability and reliability of electric service,” as
one of five factors. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703.151 (2009);
50. Distributed Generation, NOI-2014-001, 2015 WL 6758412, (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://efs.iowa.gov/cs/groups/external/documents/docket/mdax/mtqx/~edisp/1141884.pdf.
51. Id. at *5.
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Alliant Energy, responded to this call by proposing steep new fees for customers
who participated in their pilot programs. 52 These proposed fees drew the attention
of solar advocates, who warned that the proposed fees would stifle the solar industry in Iowa.53 The utilities argued that solar customers do not pay a fair share for
“grid-related services” and that this difference should be recovered through a demand charge.54 However, at the end of 2015, MidAmerican had less than 300 solar
customers out of a total of 667,000 customer accounts, so any impact on other customers was extremely small.55 The utilities acknowledged that solar energy-using
customers were a small percentage of the total customers, but nonetheless claimed
that it was best to address these cost shift issues early before they became more
significant.56
The Iowa utilities’ proposed fees on solar energy users undesirably violated
the principle of gradualism in at least two ways. First, it was apparent that the proposed solar fees were exorbitant in size and would undoubtedly induce a rate shock
that would prevent more consumers from installing solar. 57 Second, the utilities’
proposal came at a time when the solar industry in the State was still in its infancy.58
Rather than allowing solar to grow in a moderated, partially subsidized environment, the utilities proposed fees would eliminate any cost-saving incentives for
homeowners to install solar, and effectively stop the installation of rooftop solar
systems within the state.59 Ultimately, the Iowa Utilities Board elected to keep net
metering, but modified the program to prevent solar customers from rolling over
excess credits from year to year.60
In contrast, New York’s response to the growth of distributed renewable energy is an example of effective adherence to gradualism. The regulatory scheme for
utilities has changed very little over the last century, 61 and some suggest that the
scheme is ill-equipped to deal with a rapid increase in distributed generation systems like rooftop solar.62 In 2014, the Governor of New York asked the public state
52. Robert Walton, Iowa Utilities Mull New Solar Fees, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 24, 2016),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/iowa-utilities-mull-new-solar-fees/416244/.
53. Karen Uhlenhuth, Iowa Utilities Propose to ‘Pilot’ a Rate Hike for Solar Customers, MIDWEST
ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://midwestenergynews.com/2016/03/30/iowa-utilities-propose-to-pilota-rate-hike-for-solar-customers/ (see public comments in docket expressing concern).
54. Walton, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mitchell Schmidt, There Goes the Sun? New Net Metering Rules Receive Mixed Reviews, THE
GAZETTE (July 24, 2016), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/business/there-goes-the-sun-new-netmetering-rules-receive-mixed-reviews-20160724.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See Mark Chediak & Ken Wells, Why the U.S. Power Grid’s Days Are Numbered, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-22/why-the-u-dot-s-dot-powergrids-days-are-numbered (“Regulators set rates; utilities get guaranteed returns; investors get sure-thing
dividends. It’s a model that hasn’t changed much since Thomas Edison invented the light bulb. And it’s
doomed to obsolescence.”).
62. See id. (“[S]ome utilities will get trapped in an economic death spiral as distributed generation eats into their regulated revenue stream and forces them to raise rates, thereby driving more customers off the grid.”); PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A
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commission to begin fundamental shifts in utility regulation to prepare for more
distributed generation sources.63 In July 2015, Staff for the New York Department
of Public Service (“Staff”) published a white paper detailing its proposed new regulatory model.64 Without delving too deeply into the details of the new model, it is
worth noting how the proposal expressly incorporated gradualism into its design. 65
Because Staff’s proposed regulatory changes were so fundamental, Staff
wanted to ensure that they would not prevent the state from maintaining a “sound
electric industry,” and secure grid.66 Staff discussed the need to protect consumers
from rate shocks during the transition.67 Importantly, Staff acknowledged that the
principle of gradualism should not just apply to rate design:
The principle of gradualism should apply not only for customers but also for
whole industries, such as solar and energy efficiency providers, that have responded to state policies and developed businesses in the state. Any changes affecting these industries should provide ample time for businesses to adapt and plan
for new forms of opportunity.68
As Staff recognized, this broad perspective requiring special consideration of
“any changes affecting [renewable energy] industries,” provides a valuable lens
when reviewing proposed policy changes. 69 This article argues that more policymakers should similarly consider such broader impacts when crafting incentive policies within the environmental sustainability realm. 70
iii. The Principle of Respecting Investment-Backed Expectations
Incentive policies are also more efficient, and equitable when changes to such
policies respect citizens’ investment-backed expectations. Stemming from the Fifth
Amendment,71 the principle of respecting investment-backed expectations first appeared in the United States Supreme Court takings analysis in Pennsylvania Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.72 When a governmental action compromises a
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 11–12 (Edison Electric Institute 2013), http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/disruptivechallenges-1.pdf.
63. Katherine Tweed, New York Launches Major Regulatory Reform for Utilities, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-york-launches-major-regulatory-reform-for-utilities.
64. See generally N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 33.
65. Id. at 89 (“Applying Gradualism on Multiple Dimensions”).
66. . Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 11 (“Rate design reform should be carefully phased, taking into account two types of
timing concerns: the time needed to assess potential bill impacts and foster customer acceptance; and the
time needed to develop information and infrastructure capabilities to implement an improved rate design.”).
68. Id. at 89.
69. . Id.
70. . See generally N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 4.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
72. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
recognized that, among other factors, the extent to which a law interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations is relevant in determining if a regulatory taking has occurred. Id. Although this phrase
has no clear definition, Justice Brennan noted that investment-backed expectations are those expectations
by an investor that are distinct and “involve[] a financial venture [in the investment] with a view toward a
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citizen’s ability to earn a reasonable return on an investment made in reasonable
reliance on an existing government policy, then a court is slightly more likely to find
a compensable regulatory taking.73 For example, in Penn Central, the primary expectation was the continued use of the Grand Central Terminal as it had been for
the sixty-five years prior to the case.74 Because the law being challenged in Penn
Central did not materially disrupt that expectation, the Court ultimately found no
regulatory taking.75
The concept of protecting citizens’ and businesses’ investment-backed expectations also relates to what some academics call “deregulatory takings.”76 Deregulatory takings occur when there is a deregulation of previously regulated property
that causes a taking.77 Professors J. Gregory and Daniel F. Spulber assert that these
types of takings can arise in electricity rate cases, during the phasing-out of incentive programs, and should give rise to breach of contract or takings claims.78 They
explain, “[a]s regulators dismantle entry barriers and other regulatory restrictions,
they must honor their past commitments and avoid actions that threaten to confiscate or destroy the property of [] investors . . . .”79
One example of a potential deregulatory taking is the recent attempts to eliminate net metering policies. Net metering is a billing and credit system that allows
retail electricity customers with solar panels to sell any excess electricity that their
panels generate to their utility at retail electricity prices.80 Net metering programs
greatly enhance the financial appeal of purchasing or leasing a rooftop solar array. 81
Major reductions to these programs diminishes the value of the solar systems, far
below the customers’ investment-backed expectations. Customers reasonably assume the incentive programs and the primary benefits they provided would remain

specific future use.” Robert M. Washburn, “Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations” As a Factor in Determining Property Interests, 49 WASH. U. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 67 (1996).
73. See id. at 121.
74. Id. at 115–16.
75. Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of Rising Seas
Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE 239, 247 (2011).
76. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1435–40 (2000).
77. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 855 (1996).
78. Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 297, 299 (1998) (reviewing J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 851 (1996)).
79. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 77.
80. EDISON ELEC. INST., SOLAR ENERGY AND NET METERING (2016), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/NetMetering/Documents/Straight%20Talk%20About%20Net%20Metering.pdf.
81. Id.
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available for the life of the system.82 Similar unjust impacts occur when a government abruptly discontinues a renewable energy-related tax credit after consumers
have made major investments based on its continued availability.83
Amortization periods are one potential means of better respecting investment-backed expectations in connection with policy changes. Historically, amortization periods were primarily tools to protect landowners’ investment-backed expectations in the context of rezoning and other major changes to land use ordinances.84 In those settings, amortization periods ensure that a property owner does
not bear a greater cost under new governmental restrictions than others without
the same property interest.85 Amortization periods are intended to allow a property
owner to recoup real estate development investments made in reliance on land use
laws applicable prior to a substantial change.86 To that end, amortization periods
permit the property owner to continue to use the property in a manner that does
not conform to the new government restrictions for a particular time period. The
length of years that an amortization period’s non-conforming land use is permitted
to continue is determined on the amount of the owner’s investment, the fair market
value of the affected property, or potential replacement costs.87 Depending on the
jurisdictions, amortization periods are either for a fixed duration, or are determined
on a case-by-case basis.88
Grandfathering provisions are an even simpler means of honoring investmentbacked expectations in connection with a change in law. Like amortization periods,
laws allowing for the grandfathering of certain policies are common in the context
of land use law and rezoning.89 Grandfathering provisions also appear in contracts,
in legislation such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,90 the Clean Air

82. E.g., Julia Pyper, Hawaii Regulators Shut Down HECO’s Net Metering Program, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/hawaii-regulators-shutdownhecos-net-metering-program; Ryan Randazzo, Some Solar Firms Oppose Net Metering Changes, ARIZ. CENT.
(Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/energy/2016/12/21/rooftop-solarchanges-appease-many-but-not-leasing-firms-arizona-net-metering/95699370/ (Arizona cut the rate of return for solar panel owners).
83. See Pyper, supra note 82.
84. See Margaret Collins, Methods of Determining Amortization Periods for Non-Conforming
Uses, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 216 (2000) (“The beginnings of amortization can be traced from the birth
of zoning ordinance in 1916, but it was not until the early 1950’s that amortization began to be more widely
adopted.”).
85. Comment, The Cost of Amortizing Non-Conforming Uses, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 442, 443 (1959).
86. Collins, supra note 84, at 217.
87. Id. at 218.
88. Julie R. Shank, A Taking Without Just Compensation? The Constitutionality of Amortization
Provisions for Nonconforming Uses, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 225, 252–53 (2006).
89. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2000).
90. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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Act,91 and in connection with various other changes in public programs.92 Grandfathering principles originate from the rule of first possession in property,93 and are
optimal when applied only “to those who previously had access to the resource and
substantially in proportion to the extent to, or rate at, which they previously enjoyed depleting it.” 94 Grandfathering provisions take the approach of exempting
parties from legal and policy reforms, and thereby preserving their property’s value
rather than compensating them for their losses.95
Respecting investment-backed expectations is not only a consumer issue; it is
of significant concern for utility companies. Utility rates are regulated by the government, and are traditionally justified by the concept that the generation and distribution of electricity is a natural monopoly.96 Consumers are better served by having only one utility servicing an area, and having governmental limitations on that
utility to guard against monopolistic pricing.97 Thus, the government grants the utility a protected monopoly over a particular area, and in return the utility promises
to supply energy to all persons in the area at a price that would cover all operating
costs, plus a reasonable rate of return on the amount invested. This implicit agreement under state utility laws is often referred to as the utility [regulatory] compact.98 Thus, utilities also have an investment-backed expectation in the reasonable
rate of return on investments made for infrastructure and operational costs.
Stranded costs are a major concern for utilities.99 Stranded costs are seemingly prudent investments that become unsuccessful due to changes in technology, regulatory policy, or demand, 100 and have been generally permitted to be recovered
through the utility’s rates.101 Typically, PUCs that set the rates have judicial discretion to allow for full recovery of such investments.102
Increases in the total generating capacity of renewable energy generating systems, such as rooftop solar, within a utility’s exclusive territory cut into the utility’s
91. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7429(b) (1990).
92. See e.g., Austin Smith, Social Security Changes: Are You Grandfathered In?, USA TODAY (May
24, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sponsor-story/motley-fool/2016/05/24/motley-fool-social-security-changes/84777406/.
93. Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 811 (2009).
94. Id. at 817.
95. Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 37, 56 (2008).
96. Brandon Hofmeister, Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: Navigating Choices Regarding
Regulation, Subsidy, and Competition in a Complex Regulatory Environment, 5 J. ENERGY. & ENVTL. L. 42, 47
(2014).
97. Id.
98. Michael W. McConnell, Public Utilities’ Private Rights Paying for Failed Nuclear Power Projects, 12 REGULAR 35, 36 (1988).
99. James Boyd, The “Regulatory Compact” and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs be
Recoverable?, 19 ENERGY J. 69, 70 (1998).
100. Megan McLean, Throwing Shade: The Case Against Judicial Interference with Solar Net Metering Policies, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,873, 10,874 (2016). A good example of a stranded cost would be a new
coal-fired power plant built when coal was considered a cheap source of energy, but has now become costly
under new emission regulations.
101. Hofmeister, supra note 96, at 62–63.
102. Megan McLean, supra note 100, at 10,876–77.
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expected rate of return by reducing the aggregate quantity of grid-supplied power
demanded.103 Electricity rate increases aimed at correcting such effects encourage
even more of the utility’s customers to invest in distributed renewable energy facilities. This effect is known as the utility death spiral,104 and is a real, growing concern
for utilities as they try to respond to the growth of distributed energy generation
within their territories. Ironically, this death spiral argument persists only because
of a presumption among utilities that they are entitled to rates and policies that
honor their reasonable investment-backed expectations.
iv. The Principle of Providing Notice before Significantly Changing Incentive
Policies
The final regulatory principle that this article addresses is that of providing
adequate notice before materially changing the benefits available under sustainability incentive programs. A practice of providing adequate notice ensures greater
equity and justice for those affected by policy changes because it gives consumers
time to respond and avoid adverse financial consequences. Providing adequate notice also invites greater public participation in the policymaking process.
Adequate notice operates as a procedural safeguard against government action.105 The significance of notice is most prominent in the context of laws related
to procedural and substantive due process. The Constitution specifically provides
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”106 and that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”107 Procedural due process jurisprudence centers
on the principle of fairness.108 Adequate notice operates as a procedural safeguard
against government action.109 If a person’s rights will be affected in a substantial
way, then that person is entitled to be heard regarding that right. 110 However, a
person can only be heard if they know they need to speak.111 Thus, notice is an essential component of due process, and ensures that a person’s opportunity to be
heard regarding his or her right is meaningful. 112
Courts usually take a formulaic approach when determining whether due process has been violated.113 Courts ask whether the person suffered a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law. 114 There can be no violation of due
process without a liberty or property interest being deprived.115 For the purposes
103. Id. at 10,881–82.
104. See Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115,
119 (2015); Stephen Lacey, This is What the Utility Death Spiral Looks Like, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 04, 2014),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/this-is-what-the-utility-death-spiral-looks-like.
105. Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1005 (2011).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. Tosdal, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 983 (2009).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 191 (1991).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 191–92.
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of due process, a sufficient property interest that requires such protection must be
a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”116 A liberty interest is broader and focuses on
whether the individual is being constrained not only physically but also socially. 117
The courts will then determine whether there was sufficient notice as procedural
due process “grants a right to notice and a hearing whenever government action
threatens a loss” to either of these interests.118
Notice captures what people view as fair.119 When the government makes a
sudden policy change without adequate notice, the public tends to react negatively.120 Individuals and the public respond in such a manner because there is a
psychological significance to notice and information sharing. 121 A deprivation of a
property interest without notice will influence a person’s decision to engage in a
particular market. That person will remember his or her experiences when evaluating the costs and benefits of engaging in a similar market.
In the energy law context, each state has statutes governing notice requirements within the PUC’s ratemaking process. 122 Utility commissions must provide
adequate notice so that consumers have time to respond to proposed changes.
However, even with adequate notice from government officials, many consumers
rely on third-party vendors for updates. For example, a person who purchases a
rooftop solar system is unlikely to have a thorough or up-to-date understanding of

116. Id. at 192 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
117. Id. (“Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning
of ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 572).
118. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2006).
119. For example, employees are encouraged to provide their employers two weeks’ notice before leaving their job so that the employer has some time to fill the vacancy. The law does not require notice
before leaving a job, but society accepts it as standard practice.
120. One need look no further than the first travel ban issued by the Trump administration in
January 2017. The administration provided no notice of the executive order to travelers or airlines, causing
major disruptions and protests at U.S. airports and other major airports around the world. See John Ainger
& Deena Kamel, Confusion Grips Airports as Courts Limit Trump Travel Curbs, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-29/airports-gripped-by-confusion-as-courts-limittrump-travel-curbs. The travel ban was quickly quashed in federal courts, and so the administration spent
more time crafting a new travel ban. Alexander Burns, How Washington State Upended Trump’s Travel Ban,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/trump-travel-ban-washington-seattleferguson.html?mcubz=3. One of the changes to the ban was that it provided ten days’ notice to travelers
and airlines. See Maya Rhodan, President Trump Argued His Travel Ban Should Surprise ‘Bad Dudes.’ His New
Version Gives 10 Days’ Notice, TIME (Mar. 6, 2017), http://time.com/4692165/revised-travel-ban-advancenotice/.
121. See Margaret Jane Radin, Taking Notice Seriously: Information Delivery and Consumer Contract Formation, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 515, 532 (2016).
122. For example, Colorado law requires thirty days’ notice to the public by keeping a proposed
rate change available to the public at the commission, posting specifically sized advertisements in each
newspaper in the utility’s jurisdiction, mailing letters to customers, and including a description of the proposed changes in the bill sent to customers. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104 (West 2016).
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the incentive programs.123 Instead, the consumer relies on the company selling the
solar panels to be knowledgeable about the current state of the subsidies. The danger in relying on a third-party vendor is that the vendor may oversell an incentive
to induce a purchase.124 This was the case for the Afortish family in Louisiana. 125
Fortunately, there are remedies in contract case law, like the lawsuit the Afortish
family filed against the third-party vendor.126 In drafting or revising notice provisions for these incentives, state legislatures will not only need to establish guidelines on providing consumers adequate notice, but will also need to consider how
to limit the incentives third parties may have for abusing the notice system.
II. ANALYSIS
The remaining sections of this Article examine some specific, well-intentioned
incentive programs that ultimately encountered difficulties or controversy when
lawmakers overlooked one or more of the principles outlined above. Section A discusses the recent Nevada net metering debate in which Nevada’s PUC made drastic
cuts to incentives for solar customers but was later compelled to reverse that decision. Section B discusses overly generous tax credits in Oklahoma and Louisiana that
wreaked havoc on the states’ respective budgets. Section C discusses three other
sustainable energy-related incentive programs suffering from similar problems.
A. Net Metering in Nevada
Nevada’s 2015 net metering dispute is one of the most widely publicized controversies in the solar energy policy arena.127 The dispute highlights failures to adhere to each of the principles outlined in Part I above. Nevada, like many states, had
a net metering incentive program for rooftop solar.128 In 2015, as rooftop solar installations started booming in Nevada, the state’s PUC made national headlines by
swiftly eliminating the net metering program and applying the changes retroactively to roughly 32,000 existing owners of rooftop solar. 129 Overnight, solar installation companies shut down and moved out of Nevada and the state’s rooftop solar

123. Rebekah Fitzgerald, Consumer Protection for Third-Party Solar Leases, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/consumer-protection-third-party-solar-leases.
124. Id.
125. Class Action Complaint at 2, Alfortish v. GreenSky, LLC, No. CV 16-15084 (E.D. La. Sept. 30,
2016).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Liz Edmondson, States Explore Net Metering Reforms for Solar Customers, COUNCIL
OF ST. GOV’TS, http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/cs81_1.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2017) (noting
that Nevada is “ground zero” for rooftop solar); Julia Pyper, Does Nevada’s Controversial Net Metering Decision Set a Precedent for the Nation?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevada-net-metering-decision.
128. Edmondson, supra note 127.
129. See, e.g., Mark Chediak & Noah Buhayar, Buffett’s Utility Gets Win Over Musk’s SolarCity on
Credits, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/buffett-s-utility-scores-win-against-musk-s-solarcity-on-credits; Peter Maloney & Gavin Bade, Nevada Task Force Recommends Restoring Net Metering as PUC Welcomes 2 New Regulators, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-task-force-recommends-restoring-net-metering-as-puc-welcomes-2-new-r/427400/; William Pentland, Nevada Overhauls Net Metering Rules Despite Objections from
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industry came crashing down.130 Months later, the commission reconsidered its decision and upheld most of its earlier decision, but amended its new fee structure so
that it was implemented more gradually.131 Nevada’s initial decision is now the goto example of “what not to do” when state utility commissions hear proposals to
modify net metering policies.132 The following materials explain where the commission went wrong and what other states can do to avoid similar pitfalls.
i. The Basics of Net Metering Programs
At the end of 2016, forty-one states had net metering programs of some
kind. 133 Recently, a few states eliminated net metering policies, and more than
twenty states are considering eliminating or modifying their current net metering
policies.134 Net metering programs allow rooftop solar owners to sell their excess
electricity to their utility.135 If a retail customer with rooftop solar panels uses less
power than what the solar panels produce, then the excess electricity is transferred
onto the grid and the owner is paid in the form of a credit, most commonly at the
customer’s retail electricity rate.136 When the customer is using more power than
the panels are producing, these credits offset the final electric bill.137

Distributed Solar Industry, FORBES: ENERGY (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2015/12/23/nevada-overhauls-net-metering-rules-despite-objections-from-distributed-solar-industry/#2adbcd0a7a8e; Robert Walton, Nevada Regulators Deny ‘Grandfathering’ Provision For Existing Rooftop Solar Users, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-regulators-denygrandfathering-provision-for-existing-rooftop-sola/413980/ (noting public disapproval by presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton, as well as Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval).
130. Press Release, SolarCity, Following Nevada PUC’s Decision to Punish Rooftop Solar Customers, SolarCity Forced to Eliminate More than 550 Jobs in Nevada (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.solarcity.com/newsroom/press/following-nevada-pucs-decision-punish-rooftop-solar-customers-solarcityforced; Coley Girouard, As Ground Zero in Net Metering Debate, Nevada Stands Out, ADVANCED ENERGY ECON.:
ADVANCED ENERGY PERSP. (Mar. 31, 2016), http://blog.aee.net/as-ground-zero-in-net-metering-debate-nevada-stands-out (noting that new applications for solar systems fell 93% in NV Energy’s southern Nevada
service territory after the decision).
131. Walton, supra note 129.
132. See, e.g., Krysti Shallenberger, Arizona Draft Order Seeks Shorter-Term Value of Solar Calculation, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/arizona-draft-order-seeks-shorter-termvalue-of-solar-calculation/428039/ (noting than an Arizona Recommended Order and Opinion included a
grandfathering clause “to avoid a similar situation to Nevada.”).
133. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE NET METERING POLICIES (Nov. 20, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx.
However, ten states offer compensation at some level lower than the retail rate. Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya
Carley, Emerging Shadows in National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30 THE
ELECTRICITY J. 35 (Jan.-Feb. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2875878.
134. Jon Frandsen, Battles Over Popular Solar Energy Buyback Plans Spread, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS: STATELINE (June 2, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/06/02/battles-over-popular-solar-energy-buyback-plans-spread; NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
supra note 133.
135. Nat’l Conf. of St. Legislatures, supra note 133.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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In Nevada’s case, the legislature enacted its first net metering program in
1997.138 The legislature placed a cap on the program, making the incentive available
to only one hundred solar customers. 139 However, over the years that followed, the
legislature made five changes to the statute and implemented various caps on its
net metering program.140 The final change to the net metering statute occurred in
2015, when the legislature moved from a percentage-based metric to a mega-watt
(MW) metric.141 Once distributed, renewable energy systems within the state produced 235 MW of electricity in aggregate, utilities were no longer required to continue purchasing electricity at retail rates from new rooftop solar owners.142 The
legislature based the cap on projections that suggested the cap would be met sometime in 2016, long enough for the public utilities commission to resolve any disputes
over the net metering program.143
Nevada’s 2015 cap change was short-lived. The solar market in Nevada started
booming in 2014, and by August of 2015, rooftop solar systems produced more than
the 235 MW cap.144 Initially, the PUC refused to increase the cap through the end
of the year to cover those customers who purchased solar panels within that
time.145 However, the commission later reversed its decision and allowed net metering for any systems sold for the remainder of the year. 146 Once the cap was
reached, the utility NV Energy filed with the PUC to modify the current regime. 147
Solar advocates and utilities argued vigorously over the rate at which utilities should
pay for excess distributed generation power.148 On December 23, 2015, the PUC
significantly reduced the net metering credit from the retail rate of $0.11 per kWh
to the wholesale rate of about $0.026 per kWh, roughly a quarter of the retail
rate.149 The PUC also approved a roughly $40 fixed fee for solar customers.150 These

138. Snuller Price et al., Nevada Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation 29 (Energy & Envtl.
Econs., Inc., 2014).
139. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.773 (West 1997).
140. In 2001, the legislature removed the cap, but reintroduced a percentage based cap in 2005.
See 2001 Nev. Stat. 604 (removing the 1997 cap); 2005 Nev. Stat. 1816 (adding a cap measured as 1% of a
utility’s peak generating capacity). In 2011, the legislature increased the cap to 2% for all utilities’ peak generating capacity statewide. See 2011 Nev. Stat. 986. In 2013, the legislature raised the cap to 3%. See 2013
Nev. Stat. Ch. 3341.
141. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.773 (Supp. 2017); Davide Savenije, NV Energy Hits Net Metering Cap Ahead of Schedule, Adding Fuel to Solar Debate, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nv-energy-hits-net-metering-cap-ahead-of-schedule-adding-fuel-to-solar-deb/404468/.
142. Savenije, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Robert Walton, Nevada Regulators Vote to Keep Retail Rate Net Metering Through End of
Year, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-regulators-vote-to-keep-retailrate-net-metering-through-end-of-year/404680/.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Sanya Carley & Lincoln L. Davies, Nevada’s Net Energy Metering Experience: The Making of
a Policy Eclipse?, BROOKINGS MOUNTAIN W. REP. 1, 13 (Nov. 2016).
148. Id.
149. Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net Metering 25 (Inst. Pub. Integrity, Working Paper No. 2016/1, 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ManagingFutureElectricityGrid.pdf.
150. Id.
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changes wiped out any cost-savings benefit for owning a solar system, and new applications for rooftop solar installations in Nevada evaporated overnight. 151
ii. Absence of Gradualism in the PUC Process
Nevada’s PUC arguably violated the principle of gradualism in at least two
ways with its 2015 changes to net metering in Nevada. First, the PUC drastically
reduced the compensation rate for net metering, and secondly, it raised the fixed
fee for solar customers four-fold over the span of only four years.152 Before the PUC
decision, net metering customers received a credit at the retail rate of $.11 per
kWh.153 After the PUC decision, the net metering compensation rate immediately
fell to $.09 per kWh, and within four years it was scheduled to be at only $.026 per
kWh.154 The final price was roughly a quarter of the original rate. Not only would
net metering customers see major declines in the cost-savings of their systems; the
decrease would occur over a relatively short period of four years. The average life
span of a solar system is anywhere between twenty to thirty years, and most of the
net metering customers affected were still in the first few years of ownership or
leases.155
The Nevada PUC added to its drastic cuts to net metering by simultaneously
increasing a fixed monthly fee for solar customers from $12.75 to $38.51 within five
years.156 Not only would customers see less cost-savings from net metering, but
now they would be penalized for owning the systems by an exorbitant monthly fee.
To be sure, the PUC purported to follow the principle of gradualism in its final order.
The PUC stated that it was “in the public interest . . . to gradually move the revised
rate structure in order to prevent rate shock and allow current and future NEM
ratepayers ample time and opportunity to adjust their current usage patterns.”157
Further, the PUC cited other gradually declining subsidies and suggested that the
rate revisions provided a similar glide path to self-sustainability.158
Despite the PUC’s flirtation with gradualism in its final order, the resulting policy can only be viewed as a radical change over a short period of time. In addition
to the terms of the policy, the aftermath of the decision confirms that the policy did
not adhere to the principle of gradualism. In the month before the PUC’s order,
1,311 applications were filed to install rooftop solar systems.159 In the month after
the order, SolarCity, SunRun, and Vivint pulled operations out of Nevada, and the
151. Davies & Carley, supra note 133, at 2.
152. Walton, supra note 129.
153. Krysti Shallenberger, Nevada PUC Denies Request to Stay Solar Net Metering Reforms, UTIL.
DIVE (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-puc-denies-request-to-stay-solar-net-metering-reforms/412140/.
154. Id.
155. Lena Hansen et al., A Review of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies 55 (Rocky Mountain Inst., 2d
ed. 2013).
156. Shallenberger, supra note 153.
157. Nev. Power Co., 15-07041 & 15-07042, 326 P.U.R.4th 199, ¶ 196, (Dec. 23, 2015).
158. Id. at ¶¶ 54–55.
159. Chris Kudialis, Fireman Is Off NV Energy’s Grid, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 30, 2016), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2016/may/30/nv-energy-solar-rates-puc/.
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number of applications dropped to ninety.160 This represented a 93% reduction in a
single month.161
iii. The PUC’s Order Did Not Respect Investment-Backed Expectations
The Nevada PUC’s decision to not grandfather existing solar owners into the
state’s existing net metering program is arguably the most controversial aspect of
the order.162 Under that initial version of the PUC’s order, existing customers were
to be paid at the wholesale rate and charged the fixed fee, just like any new solar
owner. 163 The PUC’s decision not to grandfather existing customers took many
stakeholders in Nevada off-guard because not even the utility requested this measure, and the topic was not discussed during the notice-and-comment period.164
The PUC’s arguments for not grandfathering existing solar owners centered
on the difficulties of tracking different generations of solar owners. The PUC Staff
argued that it was impractical to track different generations of ratepayers, especially if the account holder moved, added more solar panels, or the solar system
failed early.165 The PUC also noted that antitrust lawsuits had been filed in other
jurisdictions for differential treatment of net metering ratepayers. 166 Finally, the
PUC suggested that “most ratepayers understand the fundamental principle that
utility rates are all subject to change over time,” and therefore should have anticipated that the net metering rates were subject to cancellation. 167

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Davies & Carley, supra note 133.
163. Id. at 14.
164. Nev. Power Co., 15-07041 & 15-07042, 326 P.U.R.4th 199, ¶¶ 192–96, (Dec. 23, 2015).
165. Id. at ¶¶ 97–99.
166. Id.
167. Id. at ¶¶ 99–101. This logic flies in the face of the original purpose of net metering. Net metering was established to help defray the costs of installing solar panels over the lifespan of the system.
Owners paid the upfront costs to install the panels with the expectation that they could sell their power on
the grid and recuperate the expenses over time. PUC Staff’s characterization of these customers ignored
the unique investment considerations for purchasing rooftop solar, and instead compared the net metering
customers to traditional ratepayers.
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Fortunately, when NV Energy filed with the PUC and sought to modify the net
metering program in 2015, all parties, including the utility, agreed that existing customers should be grandfathered.168 However, it took almost a year of intense political pressure,169 a lawsuit,170 a failed ballot measure,171 and a special task force,172
all together, before the PUC ultimately reversed its decision and agreed to grandfather existing customers into the old net metering program. 173
iv. The PUC’s Failure to Provide Adequate Notice
When solar advocates sued the PUC, one of the strongest arguments against
the order was the PUC’s failure to provide adequate notice to existing customers
that their rates might be affected by the order. The court agreed, and in Vote Solar
v. Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, the court noted that neither the utility filings, nor the notices published by the PUC, contained sufficient notice that existing
net metering customers would be subject to changes by the PUC. 174 Accordingly,
the court held that the notices “[did not] accurately reflect [the] subject matter”
that would be addressed, and the notices were “not specific enough to alert all interested persons.”175 Thus, the rate design changes that affected existing net metering customers violated the consumers’ rights to due process, and the court set
aside the PUC order for existing net metering customers. 176
v. How Can Other Commissions Prevent Similar Situations?
Failures to fully follow the three regulatory principles highlighted above—
gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and notice—are readily
visible in the Nevada PUC’s initial 2015 decision. Many of the state’s woes could
have been avoided with more thoughtfully-crafted enabling statutes. In 2015,
168. Davies & Carley, supra note 133, at 11–12.
169. The political pressure was so intense that the governor decided not to reappoint one PUC
commissioner. See Gavin Bade, Nevada PUC Commissioner David Noble Lifts Lid on Net Metering Fight, UTIL.
DIVE (July 27, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-headed-for-the-exits-nevada-puc-commissioner-david-noble-lifts-li/423366/.
170. Peter Maloney, Nevada Court Overturns Fixed Charges, Lower Net Metering Rates for Existing Customers, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-court-overturns-fixedcharges-lower-net-metering-rates-for-existing/426302/; Robert Walton, Greens, Solar Advocates Appeal
Nevada Net Metering Decision, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/greens-solaradvocates-appeal-nevada-net-metering-decision/429806/.
171. Krysti Shallenberger, Nevada Supreme Court Rejects Net Metering Ballot Proposal, UTIL. DIVE
(Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nevada-supreme-court-rejects-net-metering-ballot-proposal/423941/.
172. Maloney & Bade, supra note 129.
173. Jason Hidalgo, Nevada Regulators Unanimously Approve Rooftop Solar Grandfathering Deal,
RENO GAZETTE J. (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.rgj.com/story/money/business/2016/09/13/nv-energy-solarcity-deal-grandfather-residential-rooftop-solar-customers/90306788/.
174. Vote Solar v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., No. 16 OC 00052 1B, at 8 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2016) (order
granting in part and denying in part petition for judicial reviews) http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/NEM%20Appeal%20Decision_0.pdf.
175. Id. at 8 (citing Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Sw. Gas Corp., 662 P.2d 624, 626 (1983)).
176. Id. at 15.
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shortly before Nevada exceeded its net metering cap, the legislature gave the PUC
broad discretion to change the net metering program, including authority to apply
any new net metering policies to existing customers. 177 The legislature also failed to
provide sufficient guidance on what factors the PUC should consider when modifying the net metering policy.178
The legislature should have included a provision requiring the PUC to consider
the effects of any policy change for all interested parties and to avoid major changes
in rates. Additionally, the legislature should have included language prohibiting the
PUC from changing net metering compensation rates for existing customers. The
statutes governing the notice requirement were sufficient. The problem was not
ambiguity in the notice provisions, but rather a failure to adhere to the provisions.
One lesson learned from Nevada’s net metering dispute is that ideally the enabling
statutes for renewable energy incentives would emphasize these principles and
better ensure that PUC’s follow them.179
B. Runaway Tax Credits
Renewable energy tax credits, if not designed around the principles discussed
above, can wreak havoc on a state’s budget. Renewable energy tax credits help sustainable energy investors reduce their tax liability as a reward for investing in specific types of renewable energy technologies.180 The purpose of the tax credits is to
reward investment in expensive sustainable energy generation.181 Renewable energy tax credits ultimately seek to influence consumer behavior towards investing
in wind, solar, and other renewable energy strategies.182 Tax credits can be an effective tool for this purpose. However, these tax credits must be designed to limit
the impact on governmental budgets and must have a carefully-crafted cap in place
prior to its implementation. As noted below, two renewable energy tax credits in
Louisiana and Oklahoma are prime examples of a runaway tax credit.

177. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7735 (Supp. 2017) (repealed 2017); see also No Solar Tax Pac v.
Citizens For Solar & Energy Fairness, No. 70146, 2016 WL 4182739, at *1 n.1 (Nev. Aug. 4, 2016) (“[T]he new
law gives discretion to the PUCN to act in the public interest, authorizing it to establish different rate classes
for net metering customers . . . and to determine whether the tariff should be applied to existing net metering customers.”).
178. The statute merely states that the PUC should “further the public interest.” NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 704.7735 (Supp. 2017) (repealed 2017) (replaced by 2017 Nevada Laws Ch. 589 (A.B. 405).
179. Rather than wait for the PUC to adhere to the statutes, the Nevada legislature simply took
the decision out of the hands of the PUC and amended the net metering statute to restore much of the net
metering program. See Julia Pyper, Nevada’s New Solar Law Is About Much More Than Net Metering,
GREENTECH MEDIA (June 16, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevadas-new-solar-lawis-about-much-more-than-net-metering. Fortunately, the legislature drafted a bill that slowly decreases the
value of the incentive as the rooftop solar market expands. Id.
180. Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 311 (2014).
181. Id. at 313 (These tax credits “seek to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies by rewarding either the generation of electricity from renewables or the investment in equipment for
renewable power generation.”).
182. See Ryan Leagre, Community-Based Tax Credits: Tax Credits That Reduce Consumer-Driven
Pollution by Encouraging Collective Action, 47 IND. L. REV. 791, 805 (2014).
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i. Louisiana and Solar Energy
Just a few years ago, Louisiana offered some of the most competitive and generous tax credits for rooftop solar systems.183 Implemented in 2008, Louisiana’s solar tax credit program covered up to $12,500 for new solar energy installations,
which can be as much as half the cost of these systems.184 In 2009, state lawmakers
wanted to make solar more affordable for the poor,185 so they expanded the tax
credit to also cover leased solar panel systems. 186 The lawmakers believed that
leased systems were one way for the less affluent to access solar energy.187 To encourage solar leasing companies to develop business in the state, the legislature
expanded the cap so that the leasing companies could also access the same tax
credit.188
The Louisiana legislature admirably sought to generate investment in the solar
industry, but severely underestimated demand for its tax credits and failed to impose a cap on the benefit until it was too late. Originally, Louisiana state analysts
estimated that the state would need to fund approximately $500,000 per year
worth of tax credits.189 However, like a runaway train, the legislature soon lost control of the incentive program as the number of claims grew with each passing year.
In 2008, Louisiana residents claimed almost $1.5 million in credits.190 The next year,
residents claimed $8.3 million.191 Each year the claims climbed higher. In 2014, residents and businesses claimed $61.1 million in tax credits.192 In the first five years
of the program, Louisiana spent approximately $147–151 million in tax credits, instead of the estimated $2.5 million.193
Budget constraints ultimately pressured the legislature to reign in the program far before its scheduled expiration date. 194 In 2015, facing a $1.6 billion
budget deficit, the Louisiana legislature reduced the maximum available credit by
approximately 20% and capped future solar tax credits at $25 million.195 The legislature implemented a phase-out program in which $10 million would be distributed

183. PACE, Louisiana Lawmakers Pass Solar Subsidy Rollback Bill, ENERGYFAIRNESS.ORG (Jun. 15,
2015), http://energyfairness.org/louisiana-lawmakers-pass-solar-subsidy-rollback-bill/.
184. Lawmakers, supra note 4; See also 2007 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 371 (WEST).
185. Lawmakers, supra note 4; See also 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 467 (WEST).
186. Lawmakers, supra note 4.
187. Id.
188. See 2009 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 467 (WEST).
189. N. Gautreaux, La. Legis. Fiscal Office, Note on SB 90 (Jul. 16, 2007) (“Annual revenue losses
from this component of the bill are likely to be less than $500,000.”) (on file with authors).
190. Jeff Adelson, Giving Away Louisiana: Solar energy Tax Credit, THE ADVOCATE (Dec. 6, 2014),
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_bdc02b75-0f1a-577d-92a431d04280c912.html.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.; PACE, supra note 183.
194. Lawmakers, supra note 4.
195. See 2015 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 131 (WEST)
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in 2015 and 2016, and another $5 million would be distributed in 2017.196 Normally,
a phase-out program is a good solution to avoid harming investors. 197 However,
Louisiana’s attempted phaseout program did more harm than good because the
caps were set below already-existing claims for the tax credits. In the end, many
investors did not receive the tax credit they were promised.198
a. Failure to End the Incentive Program Gradually
When faced with a budget crisis, lawmakers tend to treat the principle of gradualism as a low priority. So, when Louisiana faced a $1.6billion budget shortfall,
many of the state’s subsidy programs faced the chopping block. 199 Louisiana’s tax
incentives led to a much larger state payout than originally expected,200 and the
program certainly needed to be reined in. However, after receiving applications for
over $60 million in 2014, the legislature set the next year’s cap at only $10 million,
far below the value of systems already purchased by the time the cap was implemented.201
The cap forced many Louisiana families into financial crisis because they had
relied upon receiving the tax incentives in order to help fund the solar panels but
ultimately did not receive them. 202 Without question, some families had so depended upon these tax credits that they would not have bought solar panels had
they known lawmakers would change the rules midstream.203 Louisiana lawmakers
had the right idea with the phase-out program, but it should have been implemented when the tax credit was first created.
b. Failure to Respect Investment-Backed Expectations
Louisiana’s solar tax credit cap also highlights how abruptly imposing more
stringent caps on tax credits can violate the principle of respecting investmentbacked expectations. Prior to the caps, many Louisiana consumers took out a short
18-month bridge loan to cover the costs of installation until they could get the solar
tax credit.204 Because the legislature failed to place a cap on the program until 2015,

196. Jennifer Larino, ‘It’s Just Wrong’: Thousands in Limbo as Louisiana’s Solar Tax Credits Dwindle, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2016/08/louisiana_solar_credit_cap_met.html.
197. As discussed later, a phase-out program is the ideal solution for Oklahoma’s pending budget
crisis for wind tax credits. See infra Part II.B.ii.
198. Larino, supra note 196.
199. Press Release, Office of Governor of La., Gov. Edwards Details Government Spending Cuts to
Fill Budget Shortfall (Feb. 18, 2016), http://gov.louisiana.gov/news/gov-edwards-details-governmentspending-cuts-to-fill-budget-shortfall.
200. PACE, supra note 183.
201. Larino, supra note 196.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. David Hammer, Bill Sponsor Defends Solar Credit Cap that Has Upset Homeowners, WWLTV
(July 28, 2016), http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/investigations/david-hammer/bill-sponsor-defends-solar-credit-cap-that-has-upset-homeowners/283592577.
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both the consumers and third-party leasing companies reasonably relied on receiving the tax credits.205 When the legislature placed the cap below the level of purchases, it knowingly allocated less money than what would certainly be requested
from consumers.206 Consumers operated under an existing subsidy regime at the
time of their purchase, but were not grandfathered in when the legislature implemented the cap.207
c. Failure to Providing Adequate Notice
Not only were the caps on the tax credit imposed with little to no adequate
notice to Louisiana solar owners, but the “first-come, first-serve[]” system removed
any predictability for consumers.208 Because the credits were distributed based on
the application date, and not the date of purchase, the credits turned into a race to
file tax returns.209 Thus, a person who purchased a system in January, when funds
were still available, might lose their tax credit to someone who purchased a system
in November—long after available funding had run out.210 This is hardly an equitable way to distribute the credits.
Perhaps the most egregious consequence of this system was the way thirdparty vendors took advantage of the situation. Because a person purchasing a system late in the year had an equal chance of receiving a tax credit, leasing companies
did not stop selling systems once the cap was reached in estimated sales. 211 Nor did
the companies stop suggesting that customers could receive the tax credit.212 The
first-come, first-serve system created a perverse incentive for leasing companies to
sell as many systems as possible, knowing they risked nothing by selling systems
late in the year. Thus, many Louisiana residents who purchased solar systems did
not get the tax credit that they were promised.213
d. Retrospective Solutions to Louisiana’s Woes
States must understand the importance of placing a carefully-crafted cap on
incentive programs before implementing the program. A proper cap acts as a gentle
restraint and prevents the incentive from growing disproportionate to the allocated
budget. In Louisiana’s case, the cap should have been around $500,000 for 2008.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See 2015 La. Sess. Law Serv. H.B. 779 (West).
211. Louisiana to Pay $15 Million for Solar Tax Credits Stalled Since 2015, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (June
29, 2017), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/06/solar_tax_credits_louisiana.html [hereinafter
Louisiana].
212. The class action lawsuit against vendors is based in part on the alleged false promises made
by the vendors that the customers would definitely receive tax credits. See Class Action Complaint, supra
note 1.
213. David Hammer, State Rejects $30M in Solar Tax Credits, WWLTV (July 19, 2016),
http://www.wwltv.com/news/local/state-rejects-30m-in-solar-tax-credits/277215470; Solar Panel Customers Sue State Over Tax Credits, supra note 9.
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Then, when the legislature received applications for $1.5 million in credits,214 lawmakers would have realized they underestimated demand. At that point, the legislature could have either increased the cap for following years, or reduced the generosity of the credits to lower demand.
In conjunction with a specific cap, the tax credits should have been distributed
based on the date purchased rather than the tax credit application date. The best
system to manage this process would have been a rolling application system. As
part of the purchase and installation process, owners should have been required to
report the cost and purchase date of the system to the Louisiana Department of
Revenue. The Department of Revenue could then keep a running total online to
notify potential purchasers and vendors how many tax credits remained for the
year. Thus, if the cap was reached in July, anyone purchasing a system in August
would know that the tax credit was unavailable. Any customer purchasing a system
after the cap was met would be on notice that the funds were unavailable and could
wait until the new year to purchase a system.
Unfortunately, this system was not envisioned or implemented when the legislature launched the program. However, the legislature’s worst mistake came
when it failed to grandfather all 2015 customers who had purchased systems before
the cap was implemented. Data suggests that at the time the ten-million-dollar cap
was created in July 2015, twenty-three million dollars’ worth of tax credits had already been invested in solar systems. 215 The legislature should have placed the
2015 cap at least at $23 million to cover every consumer who had relied on the
availability of the tax credits at the time they purchased the system. Even better
than a fixed dollar amount, the language for the cap could have read: the cap for
tax credits in 2015 shall be all funds necessary to cover purchases of distributed
generation systems up until the effective date of September 1, 2015. The delayed
date of implementation would have helped the state avoid notice complaints by
providing consumers a months’ notice to adjust accordingly.
However, this alternative approach is not without its own problems. A fixed
end date would likely create a rush to sell solar systems by the specified date. Third
party vendors would likely engage in high-pressured sales pitches to capitalize on
the deadline. A fixed deadline might also exacerbate budgetary pressures because
the amount of purchased solar panels might be more than what the legislature anticipated. However, these concerns would only apply to the 2015 year. Caps for the
2016 and 2017 year could be set at a fixed dollar amount without violating notice
or investment-backed expectations, so long as the credits were distributed by date
of purchase.
Despite the poor response to the budget crisis, it appears the Louisiana Legislature recognized its mistakes. The legislature recently agreed to pay upwards of
$15 million in tax credits to consumers who can verify they purchased solar systems
before the end of 2015.216

214.
215.
216.

Adelson, supra note 190.
Hammer, supra note 204.
Louisiana, supra note 211.
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ii. Oklahoma and Wind Energy
Oklahoma’s recent experience with renewable energy tax credits provides yet
another example of the importance of gradualism, respecting investment-backed
expectations, and adequate notice in adjusting renewable energy incentive programs. Wind power provides more electricity to the United States than any other
renewable energy source except hydropower.217 In 2014, wind power produced almost 182,000 gigawatt hours of electricity totaling to 4.4%of the United States’ total electricity generation.218
Oklahoma is no stranger to wind. Oklahoma has the eighth-best wind resources in the country, and the potential of generating nearly 10% of the United
States’ electricity needs.219 Additionally, as of 2012, Oklahoma ranked eighth in the
United States with installed wind energy capacity.220
Oklahoma encouraged wind energy development within its borders by implementing three wind tax credits and a sales tax exemption.221 The three tax credits
include: a ten-year zero emission tax credit of 0.50 cents per kilowatt hour generated, which can be refunded in cash for 85%of its value and ends in 2020; a fiveyear ad valorem tax exemption for wind energy infrastructure that ends in 2017;
and a fifteen-year investment tax credit of up to 2% of the cost of qualified property
that ends in 2017.222 Additionally, Oklahoma wind facilities qualify for a manufacturer’s sales tax exemption.223
The wind energy tax credits create a significant problem for the Oklahoma
state government for the same reasons that plagued Louisiana. The legislature
failed to place a cap on the credits.224 From 2008–2011, applications for the zero
emissions tax credit averaged $2.5 million per year.225 In 2012, Oklahoma gave out
$18.1 million in the zero emissions tax credit; in 2013, it gave out $27.2 million in
the tax credits; and in 2014, it gave out $58.7 million in the tax credit.226 Much like
Louisiana, Oklahoma lawmakers severely underestimated the demand for these

217. Jennifer Oldham, Wind Is the New Corn for Struggling Farmers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct.
6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/wind-is-the-new-corn-for-strugglingfarmers.
218. Id.
219. Quick Facts-Wind, OKLA. RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL (2012), http://www.okrenewables.org/quick-facts.
220. Id.
221. The History of the Wind Tax Credit, THE WINDFALL COAL., http://www.thewindfallcoalition.com/facts.html#hightlights1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Melinda Stotts, Bergstrom Bills Seek Cap on Wind Credit to Fund Teacher Raises, MIAMI NEWSRECORD (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.miamiok.com/news/20170111/bergstrom-bills-seek-cap-on-windcredit-to-fund-teacher-raises.
225. Randy Ellis & Paul Monies, Tax Incentives for Oklahoma Wind Farms Are Getting Scrutiny,
NEWS OK (Apr. 24, 2016), http://newsok.com/tax-incentives-for-oklahoma-wind-farms-are-getting-scrutiny/article/5493853.
226. Id.
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credits. 227 Originally, Oklahoma projected the cost to be less than $2 million. 228
Thus, the zero emissions tax credit’s costs continued to increase and impact Oklahoma’s budget with no end in sight.
By 2015, Oklahoma faced a budget gap of $1.3 billion,229 and the cost of Oklahoma’s wind incentives and tax credits were estimated to increase to $700 million
over a ten-year period.230 Faced with these projections, lobbyists called for reduced
wind tax credits in an effort to allocate more money in the school budget. 231 However, others argue that a sudden, dramatic decrease in the tax credits will significantly affect Oklahoma’s domestic investments.232 Regardless, it is evident that Oklahoma’s wind energy tax credits need to have a cap that balances the budget while
also respecting the three regulatory principles identified above. In April of 2017,
Oklahoma ended its zero-emissions tax credit more than three years before its sunset date.233 Although Oklahoma will allow previously qualified wind projects to continue to enjoy the incentive for up to ten years,234 this bill ignores or minimizes the
principles of gradualism and respecting investment-backed expectations.235
a. Oklahoma Should Have Implemented a Phase-Out Program Rather than Move
Up Its Sunset
Oklahoma faced a quandary: its budget suffered from a runaway wind tax
credit; however, if it capped the wind tax credits too severely, or altogether as it
had done, then it would violate gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and sufficient notice. A more gradual phase out was likely the best solution
to Oklahoma’s budgetary crisis. Whenever possible, a subsidy should be phased out
with a sunset provision.236 Recent changes to the federal renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) provide a good example of how a subsidy winds down.
The Federal PTC was first created in 1992, with a sunset provision that ended
the subsidy at the end of 1999.237 Congress let the credits expire, but renewed them
a few months later.238 The subsidy expired twice more between 1999 and 2004, and
both times congress renewed the subsidy a short time later. 239 Sunset provisions
227. Editorial, Oklahoma Wind Power Tax Credits Merit Careful Review, NEWS OK (Mar. 13, 2016),
http://newsok.com/article/5484384. n.
228. Id.
229. Ellis & Monies, supra note 225.
230. Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Senate Unanimously Approves Bills Limiting Wind Industry Tax Incentives, STATE IMPACT (Mar. 11, 2015), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2015/03/11/oklahoma-senateunanimously-approves-bill-limiting-wind-industry-tax-incentives/.
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have a hard cutoff date, which can promote rapid development right before the
credit is set to expire.240 This leads to the boom and bust cycles that plague the
renewable energy industry.241 So, when Congress extended the PTC at the end of
2015, it introduced a phase-out program to avoid the boom and bust cycle. 242
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 extends the wind PTC another
three years and gradually reduces the wind tax credits available. 243 For projects
built after January 1, 2017, the tax credit is reduced by 20%; for projects that begin
construction in 2018, the tax credit amount is reduced by 40%; and for those that
begin construction in 2019, the tax credit amount is reduced by 60%.244 Any projects
starting in 2020 receive no tax credit. 245 This federal phase-out provision provides
an excellent example for states to follow and avoids the boom and bust cycles created by standard sunset provisions.
Phase-out programs implement incremental thresholds, which slowly wean
renewable technologies off the subsidies. Thus, phase-out programs permit a
slower change in a short-term period as opposed to a quick change that will impose
an immediate panic and rush to the tax credits. Additionally, phase-out programs
provide adequate notice to sustainable energy purchasers. Investors can expect
that delays in starting a wind project will result in a predictable loss of tax credits.
Coupled with the adequate notice provisions, sustainable energy purchasers will be
able to know where they stand, given the tax credit. Phase-out programs can also
respect investment-backed expectations by awarding the tax credits by the date of
purchase and not on a first-come, first-served basis as previously discussed.
Admittedly, in Oklahoma’s case, phase-out programs may not have been
enough. This is because Oklahoma had already offered the wind tax credits without
providing a glide path to the sunset date. 246 Wind energy purchasers had already
relied on the availability of these credits.247 Because these wind energy purchasers
have not received the benefits owed to them, Oklahoma arguably needed to find a
way to honor its commitments and give these purchasers the tax credits. For those

240. See, e.g., New LA Tax Laws Require Quick Decisions (Before July 1) to Preserve Favorable Tax
Treatment, MCGLINCHEY STAFFORD (June 15, 2015), https://www.mcglinchey.com/The-2015-Regular-Sessionof-the-Louisiana-Legislature-Has-Come-to-a-Close-Analyze-the-Impact-on-Your-Business-Prior-to-the-Effective-Date-of-712015-to-Save-Tax-Dollars-06-15-2015/ (law firm warning clients to quickly decide
whether to install solar panels before the subsidy runs out).
241. Felix Mormann, Fading into the Sunset: Solar and Wind Energy Get Five More Years of Tax
Credits with a Phase-Down, 47 ABA TRENDS 5 (May-June 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2015-2016/may-june-2016/fading_into_the_sunset.html.
242. Production Tax Credit, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://www.awea.org/production-tax-credit
(last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
243. Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/savings/renewable-electricity-production-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The PFM Group, State of Oklahoma Incentive Evaluation Commission Tax Credit for Zero
Emission Facilities Draft Report 5–7 (2016).
247. Joe Wertz, Wind Industry Says Legislature Betraying a Deal and Undermining Investments by
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who had not yet made investments, Oklahoma could have provided adequate notice to third party vendors and future wind energy buyers of a gradual and reasonable phase out of the program. Such an approach would have enabled Oklahoma to
comply with regulatory principles and preserve equity and efficiency in its program.
C. Other Examples of Incentive Programs
The three examples of renewable energy policies highlighted above all involved large incentive programs with deficiencies that affected thousands of consumers and impacted state budgets on the scale of hundreds of millions of dollars.
However, there are many smaller subsidies and incentive programs that also suffer
a failure to fully adhere to the regulatory principles highlighted in this article. This
section provides a brief overview of some of these programs to highlight some additional ways that ignorance of these principles adversely impacts sustainability policy.
i. Arizona HOV Lanes
Although not a large program, Arizona’s “Energy Efficient Plate Program” provides another clear example of the importance of providing adequate prior notice
before substantially changing a sustainability incentive policy. State-level policies
have the potential to greatly impact the volume of hybrid and electric vehicle purchases.248 Many states promote the sale of hybrid and electric vehicles through traditional tax credits.249 Some states offer other creative incentives, such as access to
high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes.250 In theory, HOV lanes are meant to be a “dedicated lane for carpoolers to bypass commuting congestion.”251 HOV lanes were developed to reduce pollution, so it made sense to allow low-emission vehicles to join
the HOV lane, even if they only carried one occupant.252 Under current federal law,
states may choose to give any low emission vehicle free or discounted access to
HOV lanes through 2025. 253 Each state approaches these programs differently.
Some states issue decals and license plates, while others require no form of identification.254

248. Elizabeth Robbins, Cruising Down the HOV Lane: Federal & Local Incentives Steer Drivers to
Purchase Hybrid Vehicles, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76–77 (2009).
249. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Alt. Fuel Vehicles and High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes, ALT. FUELS DATA
CTR., http://www.afdc.energy.gov/laws/HOV (last updated May 21, 2017).
250. Robbins, supra note 248, at 77; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 249.
251. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 249.
252. In 2005, Congress authorized states to create incentive programs for fuel-efficient vehicles,
including access to HOV lanes. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144. California implemented its HOV policies in 2005 and
lasted for six years. See Tiffany Hsu, Yellow Hybrid Stickers for Carpool Lanes Set to Expire, LA TIMES (May 16,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/16/business/la-fi-hybrid-stickers-20110517.
253. FAST Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
254. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 249.
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Arizona’s program issues participants who own a qualifying vehicle a special
“Clean Air Blue Skies” license plate.255 The state’s program launched in 2007 as a
pilot initiative and was only available for three vehicle models. 256 Arizona only issued 10,000 license plates, which ran out by 2008.257 The program then closed for
three years until 2011, when approximately 2,500 license plates became available.258 The state issued those plates in less than fifteen days.259 In 2014, the Arizona
Department of Transportation (ADOT) announced that another 1,800 plates had
become available, and within a year those plates were claimed.260 When the allocated number of plates is gone, the program almost instantly ceases with very little
prior notice to potential car buyers.
It is unclear why the demand slowed for HOV plates in Arizona in 2014. By all
accounts, demand should have increased. Many more vehicle models were eligible
by 2014, and ADOT had a tracking system in place to notify consumers exactly how
many plates were left.261 ADOT continues to update the list of eligible vehicles, but
no more plates have become available since 2014. 262 ADOT also removed some
models, like the original Prius, from the list as more efficient vehicles emerged. 263
However, all existing cars with HOV plates were grandfathered into the program. 264
Arizona’s license plate program is a well-intended attempt to encourage the
purchase of low-emissions vehicles, but unfortunately the program has some drawbacks. Among other problems, opportunities to access the program are unpredictable. The sporadic nature of the plates’ availability dilutes the incentive mechanism.
A car buyer in 2017 would not have access to the plates, nor would they know when
a plate might become available. Even worse, at least some potential buyers who
thought they would qualify for the state’s special license surely discovered at the
last minute, or perhaps too late, that there were no more available. The program
could have better served its purpose if it had simply set a date several months into
the future at which the plates would no longer be available and made a significant

255. Angela DeWelles, Energy Efficient Plate FAQs, ARIZ. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.azdot.gov/media/blog/posts/2014/07/31/energy-efficient-plate-faqs (last visited Dec. 14,
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259. DeWelles, supra note 256.
260. Id.
261. See Press Release, Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., List of Vehicles for the ‘Clean Air Blue Skies’ Plates
Updated (Dec. 22, 2014), https://azdot.gov/media/News/news-release/2014/12/22/list-of-vehicles-forthe-%27clean-air-blue-skies%27-plates-updated.
262. See Energy Efficient Plate Program, ARIZ. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://azdot.gov/mvd/VehicleServices/PlatesandPlacards/energy-efficient-plate-program (last visited Dec, 14 2017).
263. Id.
264. Id.

208

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 54

effort to inform citizens of this deadline. Instead, the program has arguably been
hindered with an unnecessary amount of uncertainty and citizen frustration.
ii. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards
Some states’ abrupt modifications of renewable portfolio standards (RPSs)
have also potentially created inefficiency and violated citizens’ investment-backed
expectations. An RPS requires utilities to produce a certain percentage of electricity
from renewable energy sources, and the structure is inherently gradual. 265 The
state sets a percentage requirement for a future date, such as 30% by 2030, and
then sets incremental requirements leading to the final percentage.266 Twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have an RPS.267 Several studies show that an RPS
can successfully promote renewable technology adoption without imposing significant costs on utilities and consumers. 268 However, several states have recently attempted to cut or eliminate their RPSs in non-gradual ways.269
In 2008, the Ohio legislature enacted an RPS that required utilities to generate
or purchase at least 12.5%of their electricity from renewable sources such as wind,
solar, and hydroelectric power. 270 However, in 2014, Ohio abruptly froze its RPS
mandate, becoming the first state to do so.271 Soon thereafter, West Virginia repealed its RPS and Kansas converted its mandatory RPS into a voluntary structure
that diminished incentives to purchase energy from renewables.272
These swift and sudden revisions to RPSs are another example of how a sustainability-related policy can unjustifiably ignore investment-backed expectations,
creating controversy and inefficiency. Not all utilities upgrade their infrastructure
at an equal pace to meet RPS. 273 Instead, one utility might already be ahead of
schedule toward meeting the RPS or have the capability to increase renewable generating capacity at a lower cost than other utilities. Most states allow utilities to
trade Renewable Energy Credits which allows the proactive utility to sell its extra

265. Renewable Portfolio Standards, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., https://www.nrel.gov/technical-assistance/basics-portfolio-standards.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).
266. Ryan Wiser et al., A Retrospective Analysis of the Benefits and Impacts of U.S. Renewable
Portfolio Standards 1 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., 2016).
267. . Id.
268. Thomas P. Lyon, Drivers and Impacts of Renewable Portfolio Standards, 8 ANN. REV. RESOURCE
ECON. 141, 148 (2016). But see Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for Renewable
Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2273, 2281 (2011) (finding that RPS standards have a
negative effect on investments in renewable energy).
269. See Herman K. Trabish, As Utilities Build Toward RPS Standards, Costs, Carve-Outs Raise Concerns, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-utilities-build-toward-rps-standardscosts-carve-outs-raise-concerns/417989/.
270. J. Heeter et al., A Survey of State-Level Cost and Benefit Estimates of Renewable Portfolio
Standards 94 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., 2014).
271. Jeffrey M. Smith, The Sun Doesn’t Always Shine in Ohio: Reevaluating Renewable Portfolio
Standards in Light of Changed Conditions, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL & ADMIN. L. 289, 295 (2015).
272. Karen Maguire & Abdul Munasib, The Disparate Influence of State Renewable Portfolio
Standards on Renewable Electricity Generation Capacity, 92 LAND ECON. 468, 487 (2016).
273. See David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 369,
370–71 (2002).
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capacity to another utility that falls short of the RPS. 274 This system is relatively effective so long as the RPS requirement remains in place. However, if a utility senses
that the RPS will likely be repealed, it might delay upgrading its infrastructure and
rely on another utility’s extra credits to comply. In addition, when an RPS is abruptly
repealed, utilities that have delayed investments in renewable are essentially rewarded for doing so.
Fortunately, most states are strengthening their RPSs,275 and in that environment, early utility investments in renewables may actually pay off. However, legislatures should carefully consider the utilities’ investment-backed expectations
when considering loosening or repealing an RPS.
iii. Wyoming’s Wind Tax and “Reverse RPS”
Wyoming’s wind tax and reverse RPS program may also violate the principle
of respecting investment-backed expectations. Wyoming has long relied primarily
on coal-fired power plants and locally-mined coal to produce its electricity. 276 In
2016, an interim joint revenue committee that surely recognized wind energy’s adverse impact on the state’s declining coal industry made a proposal that almost certainly would have violated the principle of gradualism. 277 The committee proposed
tripling the state’s tax on wind energy production, increasing it from $1 per kWh to
$3 per kWh.278 Faced with a budget deficit of $200 million, the committee reasoned
that the new tax could produce as much as $40 million in revenue.279 Wind energy
advocates naturally expressed concern that such a drastic increase risked “taxing .
. . project[s] out of existence.”280 Fortunately, after five hours of testimony from
wind companies, and no testimony from supporters of the bill, the revenue committee rejected the plan by a wide margin. 281
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Undeterred, however, the state legislature proposed a new bill in 2017 that
would require all utilities serving Wyoming customers to obtain 100% of their electricity from a list of “eligible sources” by 2019.282 “Eligible sources” were defined as
coal, hydroelectric, natural gas, nuclear, net-metered projects, and oil.283 Solar and
wind sources were conspicuously absent from the list. Under the proposed rule, a
utility could be fined $10 for every MW of electricity it purchased from renewables.284 The structure of the bill is the exact opposite of an RPS and has been called
a “reverse RPS.”285 The bill failed to gain sufficient support to move out of committee, but it is worth considering how the bill fails to respect investment-backed expectations because other coal-dependent states may attempt a similar measure.
Wyoming’s reverse RPS would have significantly affected existing utility-scale
renewable projects because it contained no grandfathering clause.286 Wyoming has
abundant wind resources, and will soon be home to the largest onshore wind project in the United States.287 The project will be able to produce enough electricity
to power almost a million homes, nearly double the population of the state. 288 Admittedly, most of the electricity from this project will flow to California.289 However,
that does not justify the swift implementation of policies that would severely undermine initial investments in this and other Wyoming wind farm projects. Such
legislative action would chill future investment, breed inefficiency, and would be
very difficult to justify as a matter of public policy. Fortunately, recent attempts to
prematurely eliminate incentives for wind energy have failed to garner enough support. Both lawmakers and investors still have adequate time to design a responsible
phase-out for wind energy incentives that enables the industry to continue a
healthy pace of growth for years to come.
III. CONCLUSION
Lawmakers must achieve a difficult balance when structuring sustainabilityrelated incentive programs. These programs must advance the policy goals that
drive them and yet ensure that proper caps and sunset provisions are in place to
prevent them from exceeding budgets or disregarding the reasonable expectations
of individuals and businesses. Several recent examples of troubled incentive programs serve as a stark reminder that the wind-down strategies for these programs
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can be just as important as the programs themselves. Stricter adherence to the
principles of gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and providing
adequate notice can help lawmakers to better keep this important balance.
Although some sustainability-related industries are already beginning to mature, more incentive programs will surely be needed to help unleash the next generation of sustainability technologies. Promising new sustainability innovations frequently appear on the horizon.290 By adhering to the principles described in this article, policymakers can enable these new, exciting technologies to grow in healthy
and optimal ways.
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